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Abstract
The Japanese government has constructed facilities such as dams and nuclear power plants in the 
periphery for the purpose of supplying the core with energy and water in the process of 
modernization. This essay highlights the environmental issues in the periphery concerning waste, 
dams and nuclear power plants caused by the government’s ignorant policies in favor of the local 
people. The waste issues focus on the illegal dumping of industrial waste in Teshima and dioxins 
coming from the incinerators at Kunugiyama. The Nibutani Dam represents the dam issues. Lastly, 
the nuclear issues consist of referendums on nuclear facilities in Maki, Kariwa and Miyama, and the 
nuclear disaster in Tokaimura. It is concluded that the local people’s struggle for social justice and 
decentralization backed by others is a driving force for the government to improve its policies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Last fall, I taught a course called “Environmental 
Problems in the Peripheral Regions in and outside of 
Japan” at Western Washington University. It sought to 
understand what concepts should underlie the 
restoration of the periphery through the consideration of 
history and the structure of environmental problems. 
The topics included mercury poisoning in Minamata, 
pre-modern water control system in Yanagawa, the 
residential movement against the dam plan in Kito, 
hidden labor in Japanese nuclear power plants, and the 
atomic bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Dr. Patrick 
Buckley was helpful in providing invaluable assistance 
in preparation for the course.  
Dr. Buckley and I offered EGEO 423 as a joint course 
at WWU from July 21 to August 1 in 2003. This course 
explored the broad environmental issues facing the three 
most important Pacific Rim nations, China, Japan and 
the United States in attempting to create a sustainable 
environment. The topics include (1) national 
environmental policy and sustainability, (2) water 
resources and its control: dams, (3) the role of 
environmental NGOs, (4) nuclear energy policy and (5) 
alternate sustainable energy sources.  
I dealt with how local people in Japan struggled 
against the out-of-date environmental policy and 
opposed the nuclear-first energy policy. I also discussed 
the short history of the Ainu people and dam 
construction in Nibutani, Hokkaido. In the classroom, I 
provided our students with the notes based on the 
following references and links, and made them clear by 
showing videotapes related to the topics. This essay 
shows just the basic notes for the joint course focusing 
on environmental issues in the periphery of Japan.  
      
2. The local people’s struggle against the out-of-date 
environmental policy 
 
2.1 The illegal dumping of industrial waste in Teshima 
2.1.1 Introduction 
? Teshima, Kagawa prefecture Japan, is a small island 
located in the Inland Sea of Japan, holding the 
population of approximately 1400 in the area of 14.6 
square kilometers. The local people had been?
peacefully engaged in fishery and agriculture on the 
quiet and beautiful island. However, Teshima had been *Muroran Institute of Technology, Common Subject Division 
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known as an “Island of Waste” because 500 thousand 
tons of industrial waste, from the Osaka area, were 
dumped there illegally in the 1980s. According to 
researchers, poisonous substances such as dioxins, lead, 
PCB, mercury, trichloroethylene, organochlorine 
compound, benzene, and arsenic, were detected in the 
soil, underground water, and in organisms living in the 
surrounding sea. The local people in Teshima 
repeatedly appealed to the Prefectural government to 
ban the dumping. However, no one but the Teshima 
residents paid attention to the case until the Hyogo 
Prefectural Police arrested a suspect in 1991. The 
suspect was thought to have been mainly involved in 
the illegal dumping. This did not mean that the Teshima 
residents’ struggle for the solution ended. They 
renounced their claim to reparations for their damage 
caused by the Prefectural government’s negligence in 
exchange for the governor’s apology to them. At that 
time the waste disposal law didn’t yet cover the 
responsibility of the companies that originally produced 
the industrial waste. However, they were obliged to 
bear some portion of the cost to restore the island 
against the rising tide of public concern on this case. 
The self-sacrifice on the part of the local people finally 
urged both of the central and local governments to solve 
the problem. Kohei Nakabo, known as “the Lawyer for 
the Citizen’s Justice” led the Teshima residents, saying 
that the citizens’ movement, based on social justice, will 
be rewarded without fail in the long run. 
 
2.1.2 Chronological table 
1975 
Dec.18 Teshima Sogo Kanko Kaihatsu applied to the 
Kagawa prefecture for a license to dispose harmful 
industrial waste. 
1976 
Feb.23 Teshima residents collected 1425 signatures 
against the construction of an industrial waste 
processing plant on their island. 
Feb.25 Teshima residents petitioned to the Kagawa 
Prefecture to disallow the Teshima Sogo Kaihatsu’s 
plan. 
1977 
Jan.12 Teshima Sogo Kanko Kaihatsu modified the 
content of its application from harmful industrial waste 
to harmless waste. 
Feb.23 The governor of the Kagawa Prefecture 
declared his decision to approve the license. 
Feb.27 Teshima residents organized the Haikibutsu 
Mochikomi Zettaihanntai Teshima Jumin Kaigi 
(literally means, “The Congress of Teshima Residents 
Resolute to Oppose to the Bringing Industrial Waste 
onto the Island”). 
Mar.1 Teshima residents requested the Kagawa 
Prefectural assembly to suspend construction of the 
industrial waste processing plant with 1425 signatures. 
Mar.4 515 residents went to the Kagawa Prefectural 
Office to protest against the plant construction. 
Mar.23 The Kagawa Prefectural Assembly adopted 
the Teshima residents’ request for suspending the 
construction of the industrial waste processing plant. 
Sep.16 Teshima Sogo Kanko Kaihatsu changed the 
content of the application to earthworm cultivation in 
the form of using harmless waste. 
1978 
Feb.1 The Kagawa Prefecture gave a license for 
earthworm cultivation to Teshima Sogo Kanko 
Kaihatsu. 
Oct.19 Teshima Sogo Kanko Kaihatsu and 584 
residents (or 584 households) reached reconciliation. 
  1983 
  Complaints against the burning field of waste 
increased greatly among the Teshima residents. 
  1984 
Apr. Teshima Jumin Kaigi submitted an open letter of 
inquiry to Kagawa Prefecture. 
  Oct. Teshima residents consulted with the 
Administrative Inspection Bureau. 
  1987 
  Teshima residents frequently started complaining of 
health problems. 
  1990 
  Nov.16 The Hyogo Prefectural Police Station exposed 
the illegality of Matsuura’s business. Matsuura was 
charged with having violated the Waste Disposal and 
Public Cleansing Law. 
  Nov.28 Teshima residents organized the Haikibutsu 
Taisaku Teshima Jumin Kaigi (literally means, “The 
Congress of Teshima Residents against Industrial 
Waste”).    
  1991 
  Jan.23 The Hyogo Prefecture arrested Matsuura and 
charged him with having violated the Waste Disposal 
and Public Cleansing Law. 
  1993 
  Nov.11 The Teshima residents requested arbitration 
based on the Law concerning the Settlement of 
Environmental Pollution Disputes. 
  1996 
  Oct.4 Governor Hirai expressed his “regret that a 
great amount of shredder dust was brought into the 
island,” in the general question session at the Prefectural 
Assembly. 
  1997 
  Nov.24 The Teshima residents formally decided to 
select “the 1st proposal” that the industrial waste will be 
intermediately processed on the island. 
  Jan.31 ? The 14th Round of Arbitration of 
Environmental Pollution. The Teshima Residents and 
the Kagawa Prefecture reached an agreement on 
implementing an intermediate processing in the form of 
melting the industrial waste at a high temperatures, and 
decided to set up a committee for technical study. 
 
2.1.3 The Teshima residential movement against the 
industrial waste Part1 (1975-1990) 
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In 1975, a waste disposal company named Teshima 
Sogo Kanko Kaihastu applied to the Kagawa Prefecture 
for a license to dispose of industrial waste. Shortly 
afterwards, Teshima residents started a movement 
against it. In 1976, they collected 1425 signatures 
against the construction of an industrial waste 
processing plant. They also petitioned the Kagawa 
Prefecture with those signatures for not allowing the 
company’s plan. Then the plan was suspended 
temporarily. In 1977, the company applied again for a 
license to dispose of industrial waste on the plea of 
earthworm cultivation.   
In 1978, the Kagawa Prefecture thoughtlessly gave a 
license to the company. The Teshima residents, who 
opposed the governor’s decision, reluctantly reconciled 
with the company under the condition that no harmful 
waste be brought on to their island. However, the 
company broke the pledge and launched its business on 
the small island as the Teshima residents anticipated. In 
other words, huge amounts of industrial waste were 
shipped every day from the Osaka area, Japan’s second 
largest economic area after Tokyo, to Teshima by 
ferryboat. In 1983, complaints against a burning field of 
waste increased greatly among the local people on the 
island. In 1984, the Teshima residents started a 
campaign against the illegal dumping and asked the 
Prefecture for guidance. Nevertheless, rather than 
guidance, the Kagawa Prefecture instructed the 
company to dump its waste under the title of “metal 
collection” and identified the waste as valuable material. 
The waste consisted mainly of shredder dust produced 
by crushing plastics and rubber after removing steel and 
nonferrous metals from scrapped cars. In 1987, the 
Teshima residents started complaining of physical 
disorders caused by the open burning of the industrial 
waste. In 1990, the company was charged by the Hyogo 
Prefectural Police Station on the basis of violating the 
Waste Disposal and Public Cleansing Law. The Kagawa 
Prefecture should have cracked down on the company, 
but didn’t take the initiative to solve the problem. In 
turn, the Teshima residents organized the Congress of 
Teshima Residents Against the Industrial Waste to 
tackle the problem.   
 
2.1.4 The Teshima residential movement against the 
industrial waste Part2 (1991-2000)  
In 1991, the Hyogo Prefecture arrested Matsuura, the 
president of the waste disposal company, under the 
Waste Disposal and Public Cleansing Law. His 
company was bankrupt. Then the residents’ organization 
called on the Kagawa Prefectural Assembly to remove 
the industrial waste dumped on their small island as 
soon as possible. But the Prefectural government wasn’t 
positive on improving the situation. In 1993, the 
Teshima residents were determined to search for a 
solution through the Environmental Disputes 
Coordination Commission of the central government. 
This commission mediates and arbitrates in serious 
area-wide environmental disputes to solve them rapidly 
and smoothly without depending on a court. On one 
hand, they asked the commission to approve the 
removal of the industrial waste; on the other hand, they 
appealed to the public for the immediate solution.  
  They carried out sit-down strikes in front of the 
Kagawa Prefectural Office, distributed a pamphlet titled, 
“Preserving Our Home” to each household, sent protest 
cards to the governor and visited every member of the 
Prefectural Assembly to ask for their assistance. They 
also walked 300 kilometers throughout all of the 
municipalities in the Kagawa Prefecture in an attempt to 
call for their solidarity with the Teshima residents. In 
1994, the Cabinet decided to budget 236 million yen for 
the Environmental Disputes Coordination Commission 
to investigate the actual situation of environmental 
pollution, remove the industrial waste, and preserve the 
environment. In 1995, the Environmental Disputes 
Coordination Commission released its intermediate 
report that twelve kinds of poisonous materials such as 
dioxins and PCB were detected to be containing at the 
level exceeding Japan’s legal standards. In 1996, the 
Assembly of Tonosho town that governs Teshima 
submitted an opinion to the central government in 
addition to the local government demanding the 
removal of the industrial waste. GreenPeace, an 
international organization for environmental protection, 
protested off the shore of Teshima and visited the site of 
disposition. The Teshima residents brought samples of 
the industrial waste and polluted water from the island 
into the downtown Tokyo and appealed to the 
passengers stating, “Urban waste is tormenting the 
depopulated island.” The governor of the Kagawa 
Prefecture expressed his “regret that a great amount of 
shredder dusts were brought into the island,” during a 
general question session of the Prefectural Assembly.  
  In 1997, the Teshima residents and Kagawa 
Prefecture reached an agreement implementing an 
intermediate method of processing the waste based on 
melting the industrial waste at a high temperature, and 
decided to set up a committee for technical study. 
Following the mediated agreement, the technological 
examination committee carried out many examinations 
of waste disposal processes, and discussed 
countermeasures to deal with contaminated groundwater. 
In 2000, a final arrangement between the Teshima 
residents and the Kagawa Prefecture was made, in 
which it was agreed that the governor should apologize 
to the Teshima residents for failing to prevent serious 
damage, and agree to complete removal of the harmful 
waste. The final agreement is composed of 13 items. 
Below are the main points: 1. The Prefecture will 
completely remove the waste and 500,000 tons of 
contaminated soil from the island by 2016. 2. 
Underground water will be cleansed. 3. The waste will 
be incinerated at a plant on the neighboring western 
island Naoshima and melted at more than 1,200 degrees 
for reuse as building material. 4. The residents and the 
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Prefecture will establish a consultative committee. 5. 
The residents will not sue for compensation. 
 
2.1.5 Conclusion 
This case provides the Japanese people with three 
lessons. First, despite Japan’s experience with 
Minamata disease, Japan still has not placed adequate 
emphasis on the value of people’s lives and beauty of its 
seas and islands. Second, the design of core cities and 
peripheral regions emphasizes two things: first the core 
cities are dependent on the peripheral regions for their 
energy, food, fresh water and even waste dumps. 
Second, this is based upon a system that prioritizes the 
appearance of a high quality of life in the core while 
ignoring the quality in the periphery. Third, it should be 
significant for the local people to decide what to do on 
the basis of autonomy by way of prevention of this case.  
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2.2 The flaw of dioxin regulation in Japan 
2.2.1 Introduction 
In 1976, more than a century after it was concocted in a 
German lab, the seriousness of dioxin pollution grew 
when the substance was discovered in emissions from a 
municipal incinerator in the Netherlands. In 1983, Ryo 
Tatsukawa, a professor at Ehime University, detected 
the same phenomenon in a Japanese incinerator. 
However, it was not until 1990 that the central 
government took guidelines for dioxins produced in the 
municipal incinerator. Then the regulation referred only 
to the coming municipal incinerators in future. In other 
words, small incinerators for industrial waste as well as 
existing municipal facilities were almost left on the 
loose. As a result, a great number of local people all 
over the country, including Kunugiyama in the Saitama 
Prefecture, where small incinerators were densely 
located, suffered from dioxins coming from incineration 
of waste. However, the victims struggled to improve the 
situation in each region. The citizens in the core city, 
who had concerns about the deterioration of the 
environment, organized an NPO “Stop Dioxin 
Network” in solidarity of the victims in the periphery. 
These movements promoted the environmental policy in 
Japan. In 1997, the Japanese government set dioxin 
discharge standards of 1-10 nanograms per 1 cubic 
meter of air to be achieved within 5 years for existing 
incinerators operating intermittently, and 0.1-5 
nanograms per 1 cubic meter for newly constructed 
incinerators. In 1999, the Law Concerning Special 
Measures against Dioxins went into effect. Then the 
central government adopted a policy on the 
concentration of dioxins in the air, water and soil for the 
first time.             
 
2.2.2 The story of Eiko Kotani, an inhabitant at 
Kunugiyama 
“Nature was abundant at Kunugiyama. Kunugiyama is 
located in the north of Tokorozawa City where it is 
adjacent to three other communities: Sayama City, 
Kawagoe City, and Miyoshi Town. Within a 500 meter 
radius of Kunugiyama there are 16 incinerators. I 
moved to this place with my family 20 years ago, when 
it had a rich natural environment with no incinerators. 
Then I thought it would be a good place to raise my 
children. One of my neighbors moved here to relieve 
her son’s asthma, and he recovered from his illness 
completely. There was an abundance of wildlife such as 
a variety of birds and small mammals. Rabbits could be 
seen hopping about and the now-endangered Great 
Hawk made its nest here. On holidays, the local people 
enjoyed walking in the copse.   
  Open burning started suddenly. Nearly ten years ago, 
in 1991, someone started open burning in the woods 
only 100 meters from our house. They were burning 
large electrical appliances and the refuse from scrapped 
buildings in a large pit. The smoke from such burning 
smelled bad and depressed us. When the burning started 
early every morning, the air condition turned so bad that 
we could no longer open the window. On windless days 
the smoke lingered all day long and on windy days 
ashes drifted everywhere. I equipped the house with air 
cleaners to protect our health. The filters turned black 
with soot and the black gummy substance that adhered 
to the machine didn’t come off with water. Then I 
suspected it was an oily smoke residue.   
  The pollution got worse after incinerators were 
erected. In 1994, the Saitama Prefecture permitted two 
incinerators to be erected 100meters from my house 
explaining that those would produce neither smell nor 
smoke. However, in fact, the situation got much worse 
than before. The area where I lived was covered with 
sickening smoke all the time. I repeatedly faxed my 
protest letters to the Prefectural office telling that the 
area had been reduced to a zone without law. The faxes 
got me nowhere. I, therefore, had to protest directly the 
waste disposal companies operating near my house. 
They set fire to a mound of refuse beside the incinerator, 
and I had them put the fire out a few times. Once 
catching them open burning, I took photos of the scene. 
The next day a governmental official contacted me to 
inform that they were furious. Then he cautioned me 
against trespassing on their grounds and taking photos 
without permission. It was incredible. His behavior was 
much more unacceptable compared with mine. We have 
a right to protect ourselves from environmental 
deterioration.   
  Incinerators were brought into Kunugiyama under the 
Prefectural guidance. Despite the citizens’ unrelenting 
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protests and complaints to the local government, one 
incinerator after another was erected in the copse. In 
1994, we began inspection tours to Kunugiyama to let 
many people know what horrible things were happening 
in the copse. The participants were shocked to realize 
that even though factory emissions had come under 
regulation the refuse incineration was completely 
unregulated. Standing beneath a large smokestack, they 
put handkerchiefs to their mouths. The companies 
sometimes made use of dobermans for the purpose of 
threatening us. I had to call the police once when my 
son, on the way to returning from school, found a 
doberman at our front door.” 
 
2.2.3 Evidence of dioxins pollution 
 
Table 1 Evaluation of atmospheric pollution using black 
pine needle in Saitama prefecture 
Sampling location (city)          TEQ level (pg/g) 
Shimotomi (Tokorozawa)          71.4                  
          
         
         
       
          
      
       
       
         
         
       
Dioxins, the killer chemical, are mainly produced by 
burning plastic and materials containing chlorine. Since 
space is scarce in Japan, three-quarters of all waste ends 
up in the furnace rather than in landfills. At present 70% 
of the incinerators in major industrialized countries are 
concentrated in Japan. The pro-incineration policy 
distinguishes Japan from Western countries in the waste 
practices. As a consequence, dioxins levels in the air 
were at worst three times those of the United States and 
some European countries before the legislation of the 
Law Concerning Special Measures against Dioxins in 
1999. In Japan, once a system was established, the 
situation could change completely. For instance, in 
Noboribetsu City, a neighboring city to Muroran City, 
the municipality succeeded in reducing dramatically 
dioxins concentration in the air in a couple of years. 
However, Japan has relied too much on incineration in 
the disposal of waste. It must first prioritize reduction of 
waste and second, avoid burning polyvinyl chloride. 
Third, regulate trans-prefectural-boundary movement of 
the waste from Tokyo or Osaka to the periphery like 
Teshima and Kunugiyama. 
Nakatomi (Tokorozawa)          28.7          
Sakanoshita (Tokorozawa)          43.2          
Kume (Tokorozawa)                  40.0          
Kamitome (Miyoshi)          36.1          
Kitanagai (Miyoshi)                  25.3          
Horikane (Sayama)                  20.0          
Mizuno (Sayama)                   2.3          
Kashiwahara (Sayama)          12.3          
Shimoakasaka (Kawagoe)          26.9          
Imafuku (Kawagoe) ?                 7.9          
Wakitahonmachi (Kawagoe)           27.4  
Miyadera (Iruma)                  31.5          
Araku (Iruma)                  10.1              
*Judgment: High pollution area (>25pgTEQ/g), Middle 
pollution area (10-25pgTEQ/g), Low pollution area 
(<10pgTEQ/g) 
 
  
  Dioxins are linked to cancer, skin disease and 
reproductive problems such as miscarriages and birth 
defects. Even tiny quantities are hazardous. According 
to the local activists’ investigations of the infant death 
rate of Tokorozawa and 12 surrounding towns and cities 
using demographic statistics compiled by the Ministry 
of Health and Welfare, the infant death rates in all 
thirteen towns/cities were below the Prefectural 
averages during the relatively incinerator free 
(1970-80) , while the infant death rates in Iruma, 
Miyoshi, Oi, and Tokorozawa were 1.7, 1.64, 1.62 and 
1.39 times the Prefectural average between 1989 and 
1994, when the steep increase in industrial waste 
incineration occurred.      
  Asiaweek reported as follows. “In Tokorozawa, 
residents have helped push a motion through the city 
council to control dioxin pollution. ‘We know dioxins 
can damage human reproductive functions,’ says 
campaigner Eiko Kotani. Concern about her son’s 
health turned the mild-mannered housewife into an 
activist. “It scares me that we are sprayed with this 
chemical day after day, like cockroaches,” she says. She 
and her companies asked professor Miyata, who is 
famous for analyzing dioxins in favor of local people, to 
measure the dioxins in their environment (Table1). It 
terribly shocked the Japanese people who were 
indifferent to the dioxin cases and helped rouse them to 
pressure the government for the regulation of the 
dioxins.”  
 
2.2.4 Conclusion 
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3. The Indigenous People and Dam Construction 
 
3.1 Ainu, an indigenous people in Japan, in Nibutani 
3.1.1 Introduction 
The Ainu people once lived in harmony with nature in 
Hokkaido named “Ezo” in the Ainu language. After the 
fifteenth century, the Japanese began immigrating 
downward from the Honshu and elsewhere in Japan to 
Hokkaido. Afterwards, there were conflicts between the 
two groups of people. The Japanese defeated the Ainu, 
who had lived peacefully, and consequently, dominated 
this first nation. Under the Meiji regime, the Japanese 
government tried to push the integration of the Ainu into 
Japanese society. In 1899, Japan enacted the Former 
Native Protection Law, which included articles focusing 
on the promotion of agriculture. This means that the 
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Ainu living by hunting and farming was deprived of 
their life and culture. In 1997, a new law replaced the 
anti-humanitarian law, with the result of the Ainu’s 
struggle against the Japanese government.  
  Two classes are allotted to this topic. The first focuses 
on the origin of the Ainu and their struggle for human 
rights against the background of discrimination in 
modern times, while the second highlights the Ainu’s 
thought on nature and the verdict of the Nibutani Dam 
Case which triggered the 1997 Act.   
 
3.1.2 The origin of the Ainu   
“Ainu” means human. The Ainu people regard things 
useful to them or beyond their control as “Kamuy” gods. 
In daily life, they pray to and perform various 
ceremonies for the gods. The word “Ainu” refers to the 
opposite of the gods. 
  There is no proof that determines the origin of the 
Ainu and the Japanese. Some scholars recently advocate 
the following hypothesis. Mongoloid peoples once were 
of two types: Southern Mongoloid and Northern 
Mongoloid. Before the Jomon Period, dated from ca. 
12,000 BC. to ca. 400 B.C., the Southern Mongoloid 
started moving northward and settled the Japanese 
archipelago, including Okinawa and Hokkaido. In the 
Yayoi Period (ca. 400 B.C.-ca. A.D. 250), the Northern 
Mongoloid, who are considered to have rice crop skills, 
arrived at the present-day Kinki region in great numbers 
and expanded its territory both northward and 
southward. It was not until the end of seventh century 
that the Japanese state came into existence for the first 
time. At that time Hokkaido, Tohoku, and Okinawa 
were not included as a part of Japan. In the early twelfth 
century the Tohoku region was annexed to Japan. 
Okinawa was dominated by the Ryukyu dynasty 
between the fifteenth and the mid-nineteenth century. In 
1868, when the Meiji era began, Hokkaido as well as 
Okinawa was governed by the Japanese.         
  Note from the website of the Ainu museum: The 
Jomon Period is named for its unique rope-incised 
earthenware vessels. Indeed, the word jomon itself 
means “rope-patterned.” Such vessels from all regions 
of Japan form the foundation of the Jomon collection, 
but hunting tools and implements for prayer and 
incantation made from earthenware and stone also give 
us hints as to the daily and spiritual lives of these early 
inhabitants of Japan. The tradition of rice cultivation 
first began in the Yayoi Period. Clay vessels of this 
period are extremely simple in comparison to their 
Jomon predecessors. The importation of bronze 
technology from Korea led to the production of bronze 
swords, spears, bells, called dotaku, and other 
implements. Between the Yayoi and Muromachi Period, 
Hokkaido experienced periods of earthenware cultures, 
such as the Zoku-Jomon Period, the Satsumon Period 
and the Okhotsk Culture. It was during the Kofun, or 
Tumulus Period (ca. 250-ca. 600), that Japan took its 
first steps towards unification. The period is named for 
the enormous burial mounds constructed by powerful 
rulers as symbols of their authority.  
 
3.1.3 Ainu’s struggle for social justice 
In the mid-1400s, the Japanese extended their influence 
over southern Hokkaido, primarily Esashi and 
Mastumae. Later, they came to oppress the Ainu. To 
resist the oppression by the Japanese, the Ainu waged 
the Battle of Kosyamain in 1457, the Battle of 
Syaksyain in 1669, and Battle of Kunasiri-Menasi in 
1789. However, the Ainu lost each time. After losing the 
Battle of Kunasiri-Menasi in particular, the Ainu fell 
completely under the control of the Japanese.  
  In the Meiji era, under the government policy of 
assimilation, the Ainu were prohibited from observing 
their daily customs. Given the status of former 
aborigines, the Ainu were forced to abide by Japanese 
daily customs. In 1899, the Hokkaido Aborigine 
Protection Act was passed. The act primarily aimed to 
provide relief for the Ainu and help them become 
engaged in agriculture. However, the act designated the 
Ainu as “former aborigines” and clarified the distinction 
between the Japanese and the Ainu. In the late Meiji era, 
with an increasing number of Japanese colonizing 
Hokkaido from Honshu, the oppression and exploitation 
of the Ainu was replaced by discrimination.  
  The year 1930 saw the formation of the Ainu Kyokai, 
the first organization of all Hokkaido Ainu. Although 
headed by a Japanese bureaucrat and operated as an 
extension of the Social Section of the Hokkaido 
Government, the Ainu Kyokai provided an important 
forum for likeminded young Ainu from previously 
isolated communities to come together. In the 1970s, 
influenced by domestic and international movements for 
civil and human rights, and the struggles of indigenous 
people elsewhere, young radicals challenged the 
comfortable institutional position of Utari Kyokai, the 
successor of the Ainu Kyokai, as a distributor of 
government largesse, and also launched an attack on the 
assimilation policies of the government itself. The 
Japanese government, however, reported to the Human 
Rights Committee of the United Nation in 1980. 
        The right of any person to enjoy his own  
        culture, to profess and practice his religion  
        or to use his own language is ensured  
        under Japanese law. However, minorities  
        of the kind mentioned in the Covenant  
        do not exist in Japan. 
  Afterwards, Ainu leaders participated in international 
forums, converged with the worldwide indigenous 
people’s movement and advocated for indigenous 
language rights. At last, the Ainu were invited as 
members of an indigenous people to participate in the 
opening ceremonies for the United Nations International 
Year of the World’s Indigenous People in December 
1992. As a result, in 1997 a ruling was made against the 
Nibutani Dam, a dam that threatened a sacred place to 
Ainu culture. The ruling declared its illegality and led to 
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the Ainu New Act named, “An Act for the Promotion of 
Ainu Culture, the Spread of Knowledge relevant to Ainu 
Traditions, and an Education Campaign.”  
 
3.1.4 Conclusion 
In Japan, rulers have stressed that Japanese are 
homogenous in an attempt to urge their people toward 
battlefields and businesses. The Ainu had been forced to 
keep silent through discrimination and assimilation until 
the 1997 Act. There are still some influential politicians, 
among the ruling party, who don’t want to admit that 
there are minorities including the Ainu in Japan. 
Discrimination against minorities is incompatible with 
social justice that a democratic society needs. The 
assimilation of the Ainu is likely to endanger racial 
diversity that breeds democracy in Japan. 
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3.2 The dam construction in Nibutani 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Linguists estimate the number of languages in the world 
to be between 5,000 and 6,700, and 60 percent are 
endangered. The endangered languages are among the 
indigenous peoples, in the tropical regions, that are 
threatened by the modern development. Today 
environmental scientists come to recognize that Inuit 
people know the local climate in the Arctic best and 
Pacific Islanders have learned the detailed management 
of the local marine resources. Indigenous languages are 
linked with the local place. The loss of the local 
knowledge has gone hand-in-hand with over-fishing and 
degradation of the marine environment. The Ainu 
language is on the verge of extinction due to the 
Japanese assimilation policy. Dr. Shigeru Kayano and 
other Ainu people make every effort to tell their 
children their own language by administrating the Ainu 
language school. The verdict of Nibutani Dam Case led 
to the 1997 Act, which is expected to save the Ainu 
culture from extinction. 
 
3.2.2 The Ainu’s idea on nature  
Dr. Kayano’s speech in the book, “Fish fish, first 
people”, issued by University of British Columbia, 
which is centered on salmon, outlines what the Ainu 
culture is and how the culture has not been respected. 
  “The Ainu word for salmon is shipe. It comes from 
shi-e-pe, which means “the real thing we eat” our staple 
food. In particular, when we caught salmon before they 
spawned we took only the amount needed to eat for that 
day. One reason is that before they have laid their eggs 
salmon hey are very fatty, so if split and dried they turn 
brown with the fat and taste bad, no matter how they are 
prepared. Knowing this well, the Ainu never caught 
salmon before they had spawned if they intended to 
preserve the fish. This practice was based on long 
experience and cooperation with nature, and in the years 
when the Ainu managed the rivers and the fish, they ate 
only the ‘interest’ on the returning fish, so there was 
never a worry about the ‘capital’ or main stock of fish 
disappearing. 
The Japanese who immigrated into our land in 
overwhelming numbers unilaterally imposed a ban on 
the harvest of salmon, an act of Ainu-killing foolishness 
that robbed our people of the right to a living, and 
thereby the right to life. Forbidden to catch their staple 
food, the Ainu fell into indescribable hardship with 
many starving to death. This accelerated the precipitous 
decline in population. 
When I was a child, our father secretly caught salmon 
in the dead of night, cooked it right away and fed it to 
the children. We were warned that if a stranger asked us 
if we ate salmon, we must not admit it. In other words, 
children of my generation have a memory that salmon 
was a food to be eaten in secret. Once my father was 
being taken away by the police for catching salmon, the 
fish that he caught for us and told us to eat without ever 
telling anyone, the fish you weren’t allowed to catch. As 
my father was led away, I ran after him, sobbing. I 
remember this as clearly as if it were yesterday and the 
memory always bring tears to my eyes.  
More than seventy years have passed since my father 
was led off, but today, Ainu rights to salmon are not yet 
recognized, and if we attempt to catch a single fish 
without permission, we can be arrested. From the age of 
the gods, from the age of the ancestors, the Ainu people 
have lived on salmon. So I raise my voice to say to the 
Japanese who invaded our land and stole our fish, ‘Give 
us back our staple food!’ 
While it goes without saying that language is 
extremely important in the transmission of culture, I 
would like to say that Ainu should also be able to catch 
salmon freely for the sake of transmission of our food 
culture. I should also mention that there are at least two 
dozen traditional ways of preparing salmon to eat, and 
this tradition must not be lost. Only by going to the river 
and catching fish with our own hands, using our own 
tools, can Ainu begin to understand our traditional food 
culture. 
The Ainu of old considered nature to be sacred 
because they saw the sea, the rivers and mountains as 
divine storehouses of food. For this reason they 
celebrated the god of the sea, Atuykorkamuy; the god of 
the mountain forests, Shirkorkamuy; and the god of 
river waters, Wakkauskamui. These gods fed us with 
food from nature and kept us alive.” 
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3.2.3 Nibutani Dam Case 
The 1997 Act recognizes the Ainu as an ethnic minority 
with a need to protect its cultural heritage; it does not 
however, protect their indigenous rights. The law came 
into effect after a court case involving the two Ainu, Dr. 
Kayano and Mr. Tadashi Kaizawa, who were fighting to 
stop the building of a dam on their property. The case is 
known as the Nibutani Dam Case. 
  In the 1960s, the Japanese government planned to 
build the Nibutani Dam in the Saru River for the 
purpose of supplying water to the industrial park of 
Tomakomai. Although the industrial park went bankrupt 
soon, the government did not cancel the plan, and 
changed the purpose of the dam from water supply to 
the industrial park to control floods. In other words, the 
bureaucrats who took charge of the dam plan tried to 
force the dam construction by changing the purpose. 
The Japanese government, therefore, carried out the 
expropriation of the land that the two Ainu didn’t 
surrender to the government. In 1993, Dr. Kayano and 
Mr. Koichi Kaizawa, the late Tadashi’s son, sued the 
government for the invalidity of the expropriation and 
suspension of the construction. In 1997, the court, on 
one hand, declared that the expropriation was illegal and 
that the Ainu were an indigenous people by 
international definition. The court, on the other hand, 
ruled that the dam was completed and consequently, it 
would be against the public interest to have the dam 
dismantled, which means that the ruling partially 
dismissed the two plaintiffs’ claim. However, it 
produced a great outcome for all of the Ainu. The 1997 
Act is considered an answer to the court’s decision.      
 
3.2.4 Conclusion 
Mr. Kaizawa, one of the plaintiffs of the Nibutani Dam 
Case, complained that the Nibutani Dam must be 
conserved as a symbol of negative heritage to the Ainu. 
What he really wanted to do was to restore the nature, 
which should underlie the culture, destroyed by the 
so-called modernization including the Dam construction. 
He, therefore, established an NPO a couple of years ago 
to replace the needle trees in his land with native ones. 
Today’s Hokkaido is built on the basis of the Japanese 
modern knowledge influenced by Western countries. 
The local knowledge based on the Ainu culture that has 
been created through cooperative work in line with 
nature might be a key concept to sustain Hokkaido. The 
first step in the right direction will begin by returning 
the right to catch salmon to the Ainu people.   
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4. Local people’s opposition to the nuclear-first 
energy policy 
  
4.1 Referendums on nuclear facilities in Japan 
4.1.1 Introduction 
More than half a century has passed since atomic bombs 
were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki for the first 
time in human history. The Japanese people mourn for 
the victims and vow never to cause a war in future every 
August. Despite the unsolved issues of waste disposal 
and the possibility of developing nuclear weapons, 
nuclear power plants have spread in the name of nuclear 
energy for peace. The central government has forcibly 
promoted a nuclear-first energy policy as a national 
policy with discussion in closed-door meetings. 
However, public opinion has grown more hostile 
towards the government as a result of a series of 
high-profile accidents and cover-ups in recent years. 
These include a leakage of sodium coolant at the first 
breeder reactor Monju in 1995, a fire at a nuclear fuel 
reprocessing plant in 1997, and a critical reaction 
accident at a nuclear fuel processing facility in 1999. As 
a sign of the changing climate, anti-nuclear campaigners 
have elected mayors in some towns. In 1996, Maki 
Town in northern Japan rejected a plan for a nuclear 
plant in a referendum for the first time in Japan. In 2001, 
the referendum in Kariwa, a town in the same prefecture 
as Maki, on the pluthermal plan, which mixed oxide 
fuel in light water reactors, resulted in the opponents’ 
victory. Shortly afterwards, the Miyama referendum in 
the Mie Prefecture followed these results. Thus the 
nuclear-first energy policy led by the central 
government is facing the local peoples’ opposition. 
  
4.1.2 The nuclear power plants of Japan 
The Japanese Atomic Energy Research Institute 
launched the operation of a demonstration power 
generating reactor on October 26, 1963. The Tokai 
nuclear power plant began running the first nuclear 
reactor for commercial use in Japan in July 1966.  
After the first oil crisis of 1973, nuclear energy 
expanded steadily in Japan as a quasi-domestic form of 
energy that was considered extremely economical as a 
basic alternative to petroleum. The capacity increased to 
exceed 10 million kilowatts in 1978, 20 million 
kilowatts in 1984, 30 million kilowatts in 1990, and 40 
million kilowatts in 1994. Regarding the future scale of 
Japan’s nuclear power generation, the Government’s 
Atomic Energy Commission set the goal on its 
long-term nuclear energy plan, formulated in June 1994, 
of 45.6 million kilowatts in 2000, 70.5 million kilowatts 
in 2010, and, hopefully, 100 million kilowatts in 2030.  
As of the end of 2000, the world total is up to 430 
plants, of which Japan’s share is one eighth in both the 
number and capacity. In 2002, Japan had 53 nuclear 
power plants in operation, accounting for 37% of total 
electricity generation. In addition, there are construction 
plans for 22 more reactors at 14 locations based on the 
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hypothesis of prevention of global warming. The central 
government emphasizes the importance of nuclear 
power plants from the viewpoints of growing demand 
for electricity, economic advantage, the prolonged 
period of uranium supply compared with petroleum, and 
prevention of global warming. As shown by the 
referendum in Maki, however, it will be extremely 
difficult to find land for constructing new nuclear power 
plants in Japan.  
Furthermore, in Japan, 10 electric power companies 
have divided up the whole nation between them and are 
providing electricity to each area under regional 
monopolies. Currently, the liberation of the electric 
power market is being promoted, but people are still 
obliged to depend on the monopolized energy supply by 
the companies. The monopoly represents strong ties 
between the central government and the companies. The 
referendum could be a trigger to disconnect the strong 
ties.   
                   
4.1.3 The referendums in Maki, Kariwa and Miyama 
In Japan, lands are privately owned and fishing rights 
are rendered to fishermen’s unions. Meanwhile, 
assembly men elected in their regions are able to decide 
their regional policies. In order to build a nuclear plant, 
the purchase of the construction site, the renunciation of 
fishing right on the area to be affected by hot waste 
water, and the agreement of the mayor and the assembly 
will be needed.   
The electric companies are able to construct and 
operate a nuclear power plant, once they secure the land 
and the sea rights, and obtain the agreement from 
municipalities. Under the slogan of “Nuclear power is a 
state policy, so you should be cooperative,” the land and 
the sea rights were sold at dozens of times higher than 
regular prices. Municipal officials were made to agree, 
after being persuaded that the region would be enriched 
by the government’s incentives for building nuclear 
power plants. In fact, compared to regions without 
nuclear power plants, enormous amounts of subsidies 
and donations were allocated, public buildings were 
constructed, and roads and ports were renovated. For 
instance, Tomari, the richest community in Hokkaido, 
gets a huge amount of subsidy in exchange for 
acceptance of the nuclear power plants. 
Nevertheless, the first referendum held in Japan was 
on the approval of the construction of a nuclear power 
plant in Maki Town, Niigata Prefecture on August 4 
1996. Since then, there have been a number of referenda 
over the issues such as an industrial waste disposal site, 
a military base and so forth. According to Japanese laws, 
the establishment of an ordinance can be proposed 
based on the request of one fiftieth of the voters’ direct 
claim, but without the action of the assembly, that 
ordinance can’t be passed into law. 
The direct proposal for a referendum on the 
Pluthermal plan in Kariwa village was submitted for the 
first time by Kariwa and Kashiwazaki to the assembly 
in January 1999. However, the proposal was dismissed 
on March 23. After that, the JCO nuclear accident took 
place, followed by the exposure of the date falsification 
of MOX fuel for the Takahama nuclear power plant 
owned by KEPCO, and the scandal concerning slush 
spending on Rapika built with the government subsidies 
for promoting areas adjacent to nuclear power plants. 
Due to this series of incidents, the referenda were 
finally undertaken. 
Both in Maki and Kariwa, promoters of nuclear 
energy, expressed their opposition to the referenda, 
insisting that referenda were unnecessary. There were 
indescribable difficulties on the way to the 
implementation of the referenda. Miyama Town 
referendum was different from these two. First, the 
utility did not even have a plan yet to build a nuclear 
power plant in the town. Second, the bill was proposed 
by nuclear promoters (it is said that the Town Mayor, 
who is a civil engineering and building contractor, was 
the one pulling the strings). 
Miyama Town is located 15 km southwest, in a 
straight line, from the former planned site for the Chubu 
Electric Power Company’s Ashihama nuclear plant. The 
company had given up on this project in Feburuary, 
2000, after the governor of the Mie Prefecture 
announced that plans for Ashihama would be cancelled. 
As an alternative to the plan for the Ashihama nuclear 
plant, local building contractors (who are also town 
councilors) waged a campaign to have the plant built in 
Miyama Town. Since they collected petitions in favor of 
the project from more than 63% of the constituents, they 
proposed the referendum with confidence. However, 
many people who signed the petition did so reluctantly 
under pressure in relation to their work, or because they 
were asked by relatives. On November 18, 2001, a 
referendum was held. The voter turn out was 88.64% 
and the overwhelming majority voted against the plan. 
  
4.1.4 Conclusion 
The nuclear power plant is in principle incompatible 
with modern democracy. The control of the nuclear 
power plant requires centralization, while our society is 
heading for modern democracy based on 
decentralization. Local people have been divided into 
two groups: for and against the plan of nuclear power 
plants by the central government. In recent years, some 
local people who doubt the government’s decision to 
build a nuclear power plant without their approval have 
tried to implement a referendum over the self-righteous 
decision. They have won in three places: Maki, Kariwa 
and Miyama. As a result, the central government and the 
electric power companies need to review their plan of 
nuclear power plants in such areas. In this context, the 
central government must change its nuclear-first energy 
policy based on the will of the local people. Priority 
needs to be taken, not to increase nuclear power plants, 
but to reduce the amount of electric supply through the 
increase of electrical efficiency, to shift the energy 
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resources from nuclear and fossil fuel, to the renewable, 
and to democratize the energy policy.   
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4.2 The nuclear disaster in Tokaimura 
4.2.1 Introduction 
In 1999, a nuclear accident occurred in a private nuclear 
conversion plant in Tokaimura, Japan. Dozens of 
workers were exposed to a massive dose of radioactivity 
and two of them died in hospital. Thousands of the local 
residents were evacuated. It is rated the worst nuclear 
accident since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. In 2000, the 
accident investigation committee founded by Citizens’ 
Nuclear Information Center, the most reliable Non 
Profit Organization for nuclear problems in Japan, 
presented a result of the poll of the local residents of 
Tokaimura on the accident at an international 
conference in Germany. Tokaimura is where the 
Japanese nuclear development began, and 1/3 of the 
village’s population works for the nuclear industry. 
Nevertheless, the results of their poll show that 38% are 
against any further development of nuclear energy, and 
53% felt that nuclear business in the village should be 
down-sized from now on. It shows that Japan’s energy 
policy has to be totally revised.  
 
4.2.2 The first critical reaction accident outside the 
nuclear reactor 
An article in the Time magazine gave an outline of how 
the Japan’s worst ever nuclear disaster occurred. The 
Tokaimura unit is part of the fuel supply line for an 
experimental fast-breeder reactor nearby. At the 
conversion plant, uranium is combined with nitric acid 
to produce uranium dioxide; this is taken to another 
facility where it is combined with plutonium to produce 
the enriched uranium pellets used as fuel at power 
plants. What happened on October 30, according to JCO 
Co. Ltd., (apparently the name of the company is JCO, 
Inc., formerly known as the Japan Atomic Fuel 
Conversion Company, JCO not being an acronym, but 
the name itself), the subsidiary of Sumitomo Metal 
Mining that operates the plant, is that workers mixed 
too much uranium-16 Kg instead of the maximum 
allowed 2.4 Kg-with the nitric acid. They used stainless 
steel buckets to pour the liquefied uranium solution into 
a large tank. By doing so, they bypassed the usual 
procedure of feeding the uranium solution through a 
device that measures the proper amount to be 
distributed to the tank, apparently because the plan had 
received an order to produce a higher grade of the 
uranium compound. News reports in Japan say the 
workers, who each had at least 10 years of experience, 
were not practiced in mixing the uranium solution in 
this unorthodox manner. The result was a potent 
radioactive cocktail. The concentration of uranium was 
so much higher than usual that by the time workers had 
poured the seventh bucketful of the concoction into the 
tank, it triggered nuclear fission. Tokaimura, a 
sprawling coastal town, should be prepared for nuclear 
accidents. Its 33,900 residents live in the vicinity of 15 
nuclear-related facilities. The town has a Nuclear 
Energy Science Museum, road signs with cartoon 
drawings of Albert Einstein and avenues with names 
like Atomic Research Street. The town has witnessed 
three other major accidents in the past four years: a 
radiation leak at another plant in 1995, a fire and 
explosion at a nuclear-waste treatment plant in March 
1997 and the discovery of 2,000 drums leaking 
radioactive waste in August 1997.   
 
4.2.3 The chronology 
September 30, 1999  
At around 10h35, a severe accident was initiated at 
JCO’s uranium conversion facility in Tokaimura, about 
130 km north-east of Tokyo. JCO is one of the only two 
companies, along with Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co. Ltd., 
to produce nuclear fuel in Japan. Mitsubishi specializes 
in fuel for pressurized water reactors, while JCO since 
1980 has manufactures’ fuels for light water reactors 
and fast breeder reactors. According to Japan Atomic 
Industrial Forum, the JCO’s Tokai plant is able to 
process 715 tons of uranium for light water reactor fuel 
and three tons of uranium for FBR fuel. The conversion 
of fuel for Joyo was the first operation of that kind in 
three years and only began on September 22. JCO 
employs 154 persons. At least two of the three operators 
have been exposed to lethal doses of radiation. The 
doses, re-evaluated on the basis of blood analysis, 
received by the three men exposed to the highest levels 
were respectively 17Sv (age 35), 10Sv (age 39), 3Sv 
(age 54). The doses are equivalent or even worse than 
that of the ground zero at Nagasaki or Hiroshima. 
Various medical teams are working hard to save their 
lives. Three ambulance staff members who rescued the 
three workers also received high doses. In addition, 18 
workers who carried out the work outside the facility to 
destroy the cooling water pipes leading to the 
precipitation tank-an operation carried out in order to 
get the water out which functioned as a moderator 
during the accident - received doses estimated between 
20mSv and 103mSv, most of them in 2 to 3 minutes 
only. Some of the workers also went inside to put 
neutron absorbing boron water into the tank. The legal 
limit for workers in Japan is 50mSv per year. In case of 
emergency, the limit is exceptionally 100mSv for a 
single operation. Six workers who worked on the 
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cooling circuit of the precipitation tank have received 
neutron+gamma radiation beyond the 100mSv 
emergency limit prescribed by IAEA. The NSC decided 
to take the measure “beyond the law.” Workers should 
operate under a special limit of 200mSv, said one 
member of the NSC. In total, the number of exposed 
workers rose, with the accident management teams 
working on site, to 55 people as of 2 October 1999. This 
included 39 JCO staff members and subcontractors, the 
3 ambulance staffers and 7 construction workers who 
were involved in renovation of the commercial golf 
course directly adjacent to the JCO plant. 
  At 11h15, the JCO mentioned the possibility of a 
critical reaction accident in its first notification of the 
event to the Science and Technology Agency (STA).  
  At 11h33, the JCO informed Tokaimura’s 
municipality of an accident that occurred in their 
facility.  
  At 12h19, the JCO in its 3rd notification requested 
the evacuation of the general public around the plant. 
The community of Tokaimura established an 
“Anti-disaster” head-quarter.  
  At 12h30, the head of the Prime Minister’s office 
received the first report on the accident. It took almost 
one hour before he takes action. At the same time, 
Tokaimura’s officials broadcast information about the 
accident via the local radios and asked people to stay 
indoors.  
At 15h00, the Tokaimura municipality issued an 
evacuation request area for residents in the area inside 
the 350 m radius of the plant.  
  At 17h45, the first meeting of the Government 
Emergency Response Headquarter was held.  
  At 22h30, the first announcement was made to the 
310,000 residents of a 10 km zone to stay home or 
confined where they are.  
  October 1, 1999  
  According to Reuters, “As of late Thursday night, 
3.1millisievert of neutrons per hour, or about 15,000 
times the normal level of radiation, was detected two 
kilometers from the accident site,” an Ibaraki Prefecture 
official told Reuters.  
  At 2h58, according to STA, department responsible 
for nuclear power within the Ministry for Industry and 
Trade (MITI), JCO staff started the work to extract 
cooling water from the outer shell of the tank in which 
the critical reaction is suspected to be taking place. The 
water reflected neutrons inwards, helping the chain 
reaction to be maintained. Due to high levels of 
radiation, workers had to take 3-minute turns in order to 
try to operate the valves.  
  At 3h30, in a press conference, the Ibaraki Prefecture 
advised the over 310,000 residents of a 10 km radius 
around the Tokai plant including Tokaimura districts 
and parts of Mito City, Hitachi City, Hitachi-Ohta City, 
Hitachi-Naka City, Naka Town, Urigura Town, Ohmiya 
Town and Kana, as follows:  
- Stay indoors. Shut all the windows and switch 
ventilation off.  
- In case of traveling in cars for unavoidable 
circumstances, keep all the windows of the car shut and 
avoid using the ventilation fan.  
- Tap water is safe, because the source of water supply 
has been changed.  
- Do not drink well water or rain water.  
- People who had voluntarily taken refuge to any 
downwind refuge point are advised to take further 
refuge, leaving the downwind area.  
  At 7h00, STA declared that the criticality no longer 
be continued. Boron water had been injected into the 
tank, successfully slowing down the chain reactions. 
Neutron monitors on site now indicate a rapid decrease 
of radiation levels.       
At 9h00, JCO officials declared that the workers had 
handled the uranium nitrate solution “in a manner that 
was incompatible with safety regulations”  
More than 4,500 people visited hospitals in Ibaraki 
Prefecture for radiological screening and physical check 
up. Although no ascertained case of contamination has 
been detected, a mood of panic dominates. The two 
victims in critical conditions at the National Institute of 
Radiological Sciences in Chiba City, east of Tokyo are 
now suffering from further decrease of lymphocytes 
-less than 1% (the normal level is around 40%), 
rendering an extreme vulnerability to fatal infections. It 
is now apparent that they suffer mainly from external 
exposure to high neutron and gamma radiation, rather 
than internal exposure. Principal treatments tried so far 
include various drip infusions, steroid medication, and 
dosage of a uranium antidote. Radiological doctors are 
now considering bone marrow transplantation in a slight 
hope of saving their lives.  
At 18h30 on October 2, 1999, the Japanese 
government issued a “Safety Declaration” stating that 
there would be no contamination in the 350 m radius 
zone and lifted the evacuation.  
 
4.2.4 Conclusion 
The Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC) made 
a statement on the criticality accident in Tokaimura, on 
October 1 in 1999. “This accident has proved that the 
existing criteria for the location of the site and safety 
regulation systems that disregard the dangers of nuclear 
material are significantly flawed. In addition, the delay 
in notifying local government and the residents, and the 
lack of sufficient information concerning this accident 
have brought to light the inability of the nuclear 
industry and the Science and Technology Agency to 
sufficiently respond to an emergency. Even at an area 
like Tokaimura, where there are a number of nuclear 
facilities including nuclear power plant, it took one hour 
for the accident to be reported, and not even the 
evacuees were given accurate information on the matter. 
In view of these facts, we assert that the company and 
the STA that can’t even grasp an accurate situation of 
the accident are not capable of handling nuclear 
? 57 ? 
Hiroshi MARUYAMA 
materials. By denying the possibility of the criticality 
accident, and neglecting to secure the safety of local 
residents, the nuclear industry and the STA have 
indirectly allowed this criticality combustion accident to 
happen. This fact should not be taken lightly and the 
responsibility of company and the STA is grave.”  
Dr. Takagi, the then executive director of CNIC, cast 
doubts on the government and the nuclear industry 
while the official version of the events placed the blame 
on human error. He stated that since there will always 
be a risk of criticality occurring at plants of this kind, 
facilities should be built according to a 
failsafe-foolproof design, so that criticality can be 
avoided even in cases of equipment failure or human 
error. He also noted that the final report on the disaster 
was issued within less than three months after the 
accident. The central government seemed to rush the 
report in an effort to get the public to forget their 
blunder in this tragedy. In my view, these critical 
opinions on the government’s attitude towards the 
nuclear disaster in Tokaimura must lead the government 
to the renouncement of its nuclear-first energy policy.     
 
References 
1. Larimer. T, “Too Hot to Handle”, Time, October 11, 1999, 
pp24-29 
Links 
1. http://www.wise-paris.org/english/ourbriefings_pdf/tokai/ 
tokai.html  
2. http://www.cnic.or.jp/english/books/jco-review1.html 
3. http://www.cnic.or.jp/english/topics/jco/statement.html
4. http://www.cnic.or.jp/english/about/paper/2000615.html 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Japan launched modernization late in the 19th century 
behind the Western countries. Since WWII, Japan has 
developed its own kind of democracy based on the 
Pacific Constitution. Equality prevailed over everything, 
in addition to desire for peace. In other words, 
indispensable things in life, like rice, were not 
necessarily exposed to a competitive situation, namely 
the market economy until recent years. It is a good idea, 
however, it demands centralized power. Centralization 
has given birth to bureaucrats who postpone the will of 
the people to the national interest. That is why Japan is 
called a centralized country governed by bureaucrats. 
The environmental policy is, therefore, still on the 
defensive and the energy policy doesn’t reflect local 
people’s voices yet. A breakthrough in restoring the 
environment requires local people’s struggle for 
decentralization as well as social justice in the periphery 
in cooperation with citizens in the core. Finally, the 
local knowledge inherited through work with neighbors 
in harmony with nature and the citizen-based science 
ought to be a key to drive people to sublate discrepancy 
between equality and decentralization.      
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